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Are Prices Really Affected by Mergers? 
Abstract 
During the 80s, several empirical studies have shown a positive correlation between 
concentration, prices and profits. It is well known that these estimates all suffer from 
simultaneity bias: market structure and prices are affected by common factors, some of which 
are not observable, which rules out any causal interpretation of cross-sectional correlations.  
Mergers are an interesting instrument to identify the (static) impact of concentration on prices, 
since they induce breaks in strategic interactions between actors. The few ex post studies on 
mergers that are currently available are difficult to generalize, because they pertain to specific 
markets. This study looks more systematically to selling prices in 63 sectors observed between 
1989 and 2002.  
The approach that has been chosen is a difference in differences approach, applied to price 
movements around mergers. The rate of inflation in a sector where a merger has occurred is 
compared to a counterfactual. In a simple framework, in line with previous studies (McCabe 
2002), this counterfactual would be built as the mean of inflation rates in other sectors. This 
paper focuses on more relevant estimates, provided by a factor model.  
This methodology allows tracking the profile of prices around mergers. We separate mergers 
between French firms and mergers between other European firms controlled by European 
authorities (and thus assumed to have affected the common market). We also distinguish 
mergers having led to an in-depth inquiry by competition authorities (« phase 2 ») and those 
benefiting from a shorter procedure («  phase 1  »). We observe an acceleration of price 
movements around the most important of French mergers, but not for the ones authorized 
under phase 1. We also observe a break in price movements for mergers between foreign firms 
examined by the European Commission, generally in the other direction. 
Keywords: mergers, prices, factor models. 
Les fusions affectent-elles les prix ?  
Résumé 
Dans les années 80, de nombreuses études empiriques ont établi une corrélation positive entre 
concentration, prix et profit. Ces estimations souffrent cependant de biais de simultanéité : la 
structure des marchés et les prix découlent de caractéristiques identiques, dont toutes ne sont 
pas observables. La corrélation en coupe ne peut donc être interprétée de manière causale.  
Les fusions, qui induisent une rupture dans les interactions stratégiques, constituent des 
instruments intéressants pour identifier l’impact (statique) de la concentration sur les prix. Les 
rares études ex post sur les fusions, portant  sur des marchés particuliers, sont difficilement 
généralisables. Cette étude s’intéresse aux prix de vente de 63 secteurs entre 1989 et 2002.  
L’approche choisie ici est une analyse en différences de différences des mouvements de prix 
de vente autour des fusions. L’inflation d’un secteur dans lequel s’est produit une fusion est 
comparée à une inflation «  contrefactuelle  ». Une approche simple retenue par les travaux 
antérieurs (McCabe 2002) consiste à calculer la moyenne des inflations des autres secteurs. 
Dans ce papier, une structure plus riche est utilisée, sous la forme d’un modèle à facteurs. 
Cette méthodologie permet de tracer le profil de prix autour des fusions. On distingue les 
fusions entre entreprises françaises des fusions entre d’autres entreprises européennes 
examinées par les autorités communautaires au titre de l’affectation du marché commun. Par 
ailleurs, on distingue également les fusions qui ont fait l’objet d’une analyse approfondie de la 
part des autorités de concurrence (phase 2) de celles autorisées au terme d’une procédure plus 
courte (phase 1). L’étude  met en évidence une accélération des prix pour les fusions 
françaises les plus importantes, mais pas pour celles autorisées en phase 1. On observe 
également une rupture de pente, généralement de sens opposé, pour les fusions entre 
entreprises étrangères traitées par la Commission européenne. 
Mots-clés : fusions, prix, modèles à facteurs. 
Classification JEL : G34, L11, C53 3
Introduction
Running from the 1950s until the 1980s, the paradigm of structure, conduct, performance (SCP)
in industrial organization emphasized that market structure was responsible for the conduct of
the ﬁrms in a given sector, hence the performance in this sector. The link between proﬁts and
concentration, measured by Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), has been intensively studied at
that time, using cross-sectional data. The general conclusion of this literature is that higher
concentration in a given sector is associated with higher price-cost margins (Salinger 1990). As
is well known, these studies suﬀer from a common ﬂaw. Market structures and mark-ups are
jointly determined by technology, ﬁxed-cost, demand characteristics and the type of competi-
tion. The cross-sectional correlation between prices and concentration cannot be interpreted
causally. Prices are easier to measure (see Bresnahan 1989). Nonetheless, they are also jointly
determined by demand and supply (see Evans, Froeb, and Werden 1993). Higher prices may
be associated with unobserved quality and geographical variability in prices may partially arise
from unobservable heterogeneity in demand characteristics (see Newmark 2004).
Mergers do not arise by chance. Factors that trigger mergers are likely to also concomitantly
aﬀect prices. However, they induce a break in the incentives to compete of the incumbents
in a market and they are likely to have sizable price eﬀects. Thus, they are an interesting
instrument, even though imperfect, to study the link between strategic relations and prices.
Moreover, mergers and acquisitions are subject to a speciﬁc control. Studying price movements
close to mergers eﬀect is therefore of importance for the assessment of Competition Policy.
A ﬁrst line of research for the assessment of the impact of mergers on prices relies on the
joint estimation of demand and supply functions for diﬀerentiated products. These estimates
are then generally used as inputs in a Bertrand-Nash competition framework to predict the
eﬀect of a given merger, through the change in player structure. Nevo (2000) studies the US
industry of ready-to-eat cereals; Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) study the truck industry in Europe;
Pinkse and Slade (2004) study the beer industry in the UK. With the noticeable exception of
Peters (2006), they exclusively focus on ex ante evaluations. These evaluations are very useful
and much promising for practitioners, even if they still face important challenges, such as the
necessity to better account for product quality changes. Besides, the precise structure of cost
and demand in each paper is market speciﬁc. Each study must be tailored to each speciﬁc4
market and it is therefore hard to generalize this type of analysis to a broad range of markets.
Finally, by nature, they do not provide insight on what actually happened in markets when
mergers occurred.
The few direct ex post evaluations of mergers on prices focused on speciﬁc sectors, such as
the airline industry (Kim and Singal 1993) or the banking industry (Prager and Hannan 1998,
Sapienza 2002). Focarelli and Panetta (2003) focus on the impact of mergers in the banking
sector in Italy between 1990 and 1998. They use time and space variability to identify the eﬀect
of mergers on the interest rates paid by banks on current accounts. They show a short term (two
years) anticompetitive eﬀect, which turns to a pro-competitive eﬀect after ﬁve years. The results
are strengthened by sub-group analysis. Price eﬀects are stronger for more concentrated markets
and for smaller deposits, for which demand is supposed to be less elastic. They also provide
strong evidence that short term price increases, interpreted as the market-power eﬀects, occur
both for merging and non-merging ﬁrms. On the contrary, long-term price decreases, interpreted
as the eﬃciency related eﬀects, are observed only for merging ﬁrms. While the anticompetitive
eﬀect is general the eﬃciences only concern the merged entity.
These papers provide very useful information but their external validity is limited as the
markets they consider have particular features and are subject to speciﬁc regulations. The aim of
this paper is to generalize the study on the impact of mergers to a larger set of markets. The only
existing general studies on the impact of mergers rely on stock market data (see Duso, Neven,
and R¨ oller 2003, Duso, Gugler, and Yurtoglu 2005). These studies are easier to implement,
especially over a large number of mergers and markets. They focus on the abnormal returns
on the stock markets after merger anouncements and interpret positive returns for the share
of competitors as anticipated anticompetitive eﬀects of mergers. However, due to anticipations
by the actors, the link between the evolutions of stocks and the evolution of proﬁtability is not
unambiguous (see Fridolfsson and Stennek 2000, 2005 and 2006). At last, the studies based on
stock markets provide information on proﬁtability of ﬁrms, an issue only tangentially related to
prices.
McCabe (2002) uses a non-structural diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methodology to study the impact
of mergers in the academic journal sector. This generalization of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methods
had already been used by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) to analyze the earning losses
of displaced workers. In this paper, we extend this methodology by using factor models to build
a more relevant counterfactual. The following section presents the methodology. In Section II,
we present the data. The last section present the results.5
1 Empirical strategy
Focarelli and Panetta (2003) take advantage of the existence of many geographical markets
to identify the eﬀect of mergers on merging ﬁrms and rivals, as well as the impact of out-of-
market mergers. This approach is eﬀective because banking has some features of a retailing
industry. However, most retailing industries have other features that raise serious issues as for
the possibility to generalize this approach, at least for France. First, the variability of prices for
one good in diﬀerent locations may be signiﬁcantly reduced by pricing practices. Firms may use
national pricing strategies in order to build a national image. Such practices may also be the
consequences of regulations or case law, forbidding price discriminations or resale at a loss (see
Biscourp, Boutin, and Verge 2008, Competition Commission 2007). This is of importance for
France, where the distribution channel has undergone signiﬁcant regulatory changes during the
period we are considering (Biscourp, Boutin, and Verge 2008). Besides, contrary to the situation
in the banking industry, retailers are seldom vertically integrated with producers. Therefore,
vertical issues are of prime interest. In particular, sorting out what is due to the producer-
retailer relationship in the eﬀects of mergers seems a challenging task. To avoid these issues,
we choose to focus on manufacturing industries. Most geographical relevant markets for these
sectors are likely to be national or wider. As a consequence, Focarelli and Panetta’s (2003)
approach cannot be generalized for these markets.
Competition authorities have access to privileged information on the mergers they control,
either through their own expertise of the involved markets or due to speciﬁc information provided
by the parties. The access to this type of information is out of reach for researchers. Besides, the
full eﬀect of mergers will only appear after a long period of time (Focarelli and Panetta 2003).
This is particularly obvious for organization or supply related eﬃciencies. The aim of the
paper is neither to evaluate the overall impact of mergers in the long run, nor to determine if
competition authorities took the right decisions. On the contrary, we voluntarily focus on short
term eﬀects. We assume that, if modiﬁed by mergers, strategic relations and the incentives to
compete are immediately modiﬁed. In particular, market power could immediately be exercised
and unilateral eﬀects would be likely to appear shortly after the merger, on the contrary to
eﬃciencies. Then our short term analysis is expected to capture the potential breaks in the
incentives to compete.
On this assumption, we focus on short-term manufacturing price index changes just after
mergers and wish to investigate if, on average, mergers do modify strategic relations, possibly in
an adverse way for customers. Sectors where mergers occur are likely to have diﬀerent observable
and unobservable characteristics. Fixed eﬀects are suﬃcient to deal with such time invariant6
heterogeneity. On the contrary, if unobserved shocks aﬀect the markets, accounting for the
evolution of prices before mergers is crucial. In this paper, a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence type of
approach is used to identify changes in prices around mergers. Overall, this approach is similar
to the one used by McCabe’s (2002).1 In line with the past literature, we would consider that
the inﬂation in sector i in time t is given by:




where #mergersit−k is the number of mergers in sector i at date t − k.
Irrespective of the mergers, the inﬂation rate is assumed to be the sum of a sector speciﬁc
eﬀect (πi), ﬁxed during the period, a monthly shock (πt), common to all sectors, and an idio-
syncratic term. The dummies before and after mergers implement a generalization of diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence methods in a dynamic framework. In this basic setup, inﬂation rates are compared
to the average monthly inﬂation at the same date, accounting for the diﬀerence of means on the
whole period. Identiﬁcation of the coeﬃcients arises from the assumption that mergers in one
market do not occur in each period and that for each period there are markets with no merger.
1.1 Building a richer counterfactual
1.1.1 Factor Models
The previous speciﬁcation has the advantage of being simple and transparent. The hypothesis
that all individuals are identically aﬀected by a sole common shock is consistent in the two
previously quoted examples (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993, McCabe 2002) as the in-
dividuals they consider are highly homogeneous. This hypothesis is hardly tenable in our case.
Sectors may be subject to diﬀerent shocks and their reaction to the same shocks could diﬀer.
The average monthly inﬂation is then inappropriate as a counterfactual.
We lack the information that would be necessary to structurally model the inﬂation in each
sector. We also lack the information necessary to extend matching methods to our dynamic
data. However, it is possible to use the panel dimension of our data set to infer some useful
information from the comovements of inﬂation in the sectors we are considering. More precisely,
it is possible to replace the common shock (πt) in the previous setup by a richer one of (q)
1This type of approach was ﬁrst introduced by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) in a very diﬀerent
context to study the earning losses of displaced workers.7
common factors. This setup is more general, as than solely accounting for the mean of the










Irrespective of the composite structure of the error term ξit, this type of model is part of the
broad range of factor models (very comprehensive presentations of these model can be found in
Stock 2006, Stock and Watson 2006, Breitung and Eickmeier 2005). These models are useful
to aggregate many information in order to build core economic indicators. For this reason,
they are now used for a growing number of applications, in many ﬁelds of economics. They
are currently used on a monthly basis by public institutes to build coincident business cycles
indicators. For instance the French National Institutes for Statistics and Economic Studies
(INSEE) uses business surveys to build business climate indicators in the industry or in the
services (Doz and Lenglart 1999, Lenglart and Toutlemonde 2002, Cornec and Deperraz 2006).
CEPR has been releasing a coincident indicator of euro-area GDP (EuroCOIN, see Altissimo,
Bassanetti, Cristadoro, Forni, Hallin, Lippi, Reichlin, and Veronese 2001) and, in the USA,
the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) aggregates a large macro dataset into one
common factor. Using factor models, Cristadoro, Forni, Reichlin, and Veronese (2005) have
built a measure of the core inﬂation of the Euro area. This aggregation of many instruments is
also used as a forecasting tool (Stock and Watson 1999, 2002b and 2002a, Forni, Hallin, Lippi,
and Reichlin 2000 and 2003). The reduction of the dimension of statistical models is also useful
in Finance, with the general use of Stochastic Discount Factor, closely related to factor models
(Garcia and Renault 2000).
Factor models split the variance of the statistical model into two orthogonal components: the
“common component” (
Pq
k=1 λikFkt), of small dimension, and the “idiosyncratic component”
(ξit). The common component provides with a “now-cast”, based on the in-sample comovements
of the various series of prices. If we assume that the price movements surrounding mergers are
speciﬁc to the sectors where mergers occur, they are orthogonal to common components. It
is then consistent to adopt a two-tier approach, which generalizes the previous diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence method. The ﬁrst step is to estimate the factors in our sample, which provides a more
appropiate counterfactual than in the basic setup. Then, we will perform the regression on the
residuals, the “idiosyncratic component”, to analyze if there are systematic deviations of price
patterns from the common components close to mergers.8
1.1.2 Choice of a model
The setup of factor models can be very general, with a complex dynamic structure for factors,
ﬁxed but lagged and even time varying loading (Del Negro and Otrok 2004). When there is a
small number of series, these models can generally be cast into state space setup and estimated
via the Kalman ﬁlter. As n grows, the number of parameters to be estimated increases very
quickly and the estimation problem becomes a challenge. However, strict or approximate factor
models can be estimated by the (non parametric) method of principal components, which is
much easier to compute. Two main methods of estimation exist, both fundamentally using
reduction by the cross-sectional dimension (Croux, Renault, and Werker 2004). The ﬁrst one
(static approach) is based on an eigenvalue decomposition of the sample covariance matrix,
while the second one (dynamic approach) uses the spectral density matrix. Inferential theories
of the two types of approaches when the number of series and their length both tend to inﬁnity
have been proposed recently. Factors estimated by principal component methods are consistent,
even when the assumption on uncorrelation of the errors is relaxed and when there exist weak
serial and cross-sectional correlations (provided that it is not “too large”). For the time domain
approach, it has been proposed by Stock and Watson (2002b), Bai and Ng (2002), and Bai
(2003) (extended by Bai and Ng (2004) for serial correlation and by Bai and Ng (2006) for
conﬁdence intervals). Conversely, asymptotic results for the frequency domain are provided by
Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin (2000) and Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin (2004).
In our framework, the dynamic approach does not present clear advantages and raises issues
as regards to the dynamic structure of the residuals. For these two reasons, our preference will
go to the static approach.
Favero, Marcellino, and Neglia (2005) indeed conclude that the overall performance of both
approaches are very similar. On the contrary, Forni, Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin (2005) argue that
the dynamic approach provides better results for it fully exploits dynamic informations included
in the series. Simulations show that the dynamic approach is likely to perform (slightly) better
when the series have heterogeneous dynamics.2 This paper focuses on series of price indices in
the manufacturing sector. This is a much more homogeneous set than those usually used to
forecast macroeconomics variables. Then, the issue of dynamic heterogeneity is likely to be less
signiﬁcant.
Besides, in static factor models, common factors are sole linear combinations of the present
2The empirical results show that the two-step procedure proposed by the authors performs (slightly) better
than the forecasting methods based on the static approach. However, the authors also implement techniques
introduced in Boivin and Ng (2006) to select the most informative series, which makes the strict comparison
between static and dynamic methods more diﬃcult.9
variables. On the contrary, the dynamic approach requires two-sided, or at least one-sided ﬁlters
(Altissimo, Bassanetti, Cristadoro, Forni, Hallin, Lippi, Reichlin, and Veronese 2001, Forni,
Hallin, Lippi, and Reichlin 2005). Then, not only present, but also future and past, values of
the variables intervene in the common components. The consequences of this ﬁltering on the
time structure of the idiosyncratic component is quite unknown. This is an important issue here
as we wish to investigate the precise movements of this residual close to mergers.
1.1.3 Data treatment and number of factors
Practically, our series of price indices are ﬁrst seasonally adjusted, using the Census X11 pro-
cedure implemented in SAS. They are then transformed to stationarity by log-diﬀerentiation
and standardized to zero means.3 In line with Favero, Marcellino, and Neglia (2005), we also
balance our data set. Favero, Marcellino, and Neglia indeed quote that the information provided
by the unbalanced part of their sample is not useful, or not properly extracted by the existing
procedures.
Overall, we will use 63 series of monthly prices for the 1989-2002 period (see Data section for
the choice of the period). Our sample is smaller than those commonly used in the literature.
Nonetheless, the fact that we are working on a smaller number of series compared to most of
the literature is not per se an issue.
Boivin and Ng (2006) show that the number of series is not the sole element to be taken into
account for the precision of the estimates. As few as 40 series may actually be suﬃcient for
forecasting.4 As for OLS, the link between size and precision is not unambiguous when errors
are not iid. If some series are only marginally determined by the same common factors, they
are poorly informative about factors. Then, the idiosyncratic component has large variance,
and these series are rather polluting the estimation of common factors. On the contrary, if the
series are actually comoving, if they have suﬃcient comunalities, they are informative about the
factors. The aim of our ﬁrst step is to “now-cast” inﬂation, using data on inﬂation. Our series
are likely to be quite homogeneous. The risk of over-sampling is then likely to be limited. On
the contrary, it cannot be excluded that correlated errors may play a role.5 However, the series
3However, the results are very similar without the seasonal adjustment and if a ﬁxed eﬀect is used in the ﬁnal
regression instead of the standardization to zero mean.
4Bai and Ng (2002) ﬁnd that as few as 40 series are suﬃcient for the estimation of the number of factors
when the errors are iid. Boivin and Ng (2006) show that as few a 40 series may be suﬃcient for forecasting. A
forecast of inﬂation of producer price index for ﬁnished goods (pwfsa) based on the “best” 33 series is at least not
performing worse than the forecasts based on the whole sample of 147 series of Stock and Watson (2002b).
5If the information is redundant, as it would be the case by pooling unaggregated and aggregated series, then
the marginal beneﬁt from a larger number of series is smaller. However, we are considering series at the same
levels of aggregation and are thus avoiding the main pitfall.10
we are considering are our items of interest. It is then impossible to implement the procedures
of Boivin and Ng and to select the “best” series for forecasting.6
More extensive ﬁgures on the choice of the number of common factors and of the estimation
are presented in Appendix A. The series we are considering have prior comunalities from 39%
to 79%. The range for the numbers of factors in the literature is quite large. They can be as
few as two, but also as large as seven, or even larger than ten in some applications in Finance
(Onatski 2007). The scree plot (see Appendix) and the formal computation of the curvature
of the plot, which is underlying Onatski’s (2007) test show that there exist breaks after the
second, fourth and seventh eigenvalues. It cannot be excluded that four or seven factors would
be necessary, even though the statistics of the corresponding test are generally smaller than
the percentiles of the test statistics in Onatski (2007). The ﬁrst two factors account for 31%
of the overall variance, the ﬁrst four for 44% and the ﬁrst seven for 59%. Stock and Watson
(2006), Favero, Marcellino, and Neglia (2005) and Breitung and Eickmeier (2005) quote that in
comparable studies, the common component generally account for 40% or 50% or the overall
variance. The variance explained by at least the ﬁrst four factors is then in line with the
literature.
The choice of the number of factors is crucial in our approach. The hypothesis of orthog-
onality may fail, especially as we add more factors.7 On the contrary, accounting for too few
factors might reduce the relevance of our counterfactual and thus the advantage of the method,
compared to the basic setup. As we are probably more adverse to the choice of a too large
number of factors than most of the literature, we will consider four factors as a fair compromise.
However, the results with two and seven factors are quite similar.
1.2 Validity of the estimations
As quoted before, the basic setup is a generalization of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methods that
had already been used by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) and McCabe (2002). The use
of factor models is an attempt to use the information included in the comovements of the series
to build a more relevant counterfactual than the mere in-sample average inﬂation of each month.
Conceptually, this approach is close to forecasting, as we are trying to build the best estimates
of the inﬂation of series, given the in-sample movements of the series. Then, we are trying
to determine if there are systematic diﬀerences in the deviations to the common component
6We are concerned by the fact that our factors are as precisely estimated as possible. However, one must keep
in mind that the “now-casts” are not the primordial outputs of our procedure.
7This is likely to be the case when the evolution of prices in the sector is closely related to the evolution of
prices, mainly for phase I mergers, see below.11
close to mergers. The gains of factor models has been shown to be signiﬁcant to forecast many
macroeconomic variables of interest in the previously quoted literature. As far as we know, it
is the ﬁrst time this methodology is applied to generalize diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence methods by
taking advantage of the dynamics of the data, in a framework where the information necessary
to build a group of control is unavailable.
Even if we believe that the use of factor models is a new and important improvement to the
methodology, our approach is still non-structural and does not allow to sort out the impact
of mergers from other simultaneous factors or events. It has clear limitations that not only
come from the limits of available data (see Data section) but also from our wish to get as
general results as possible. The decision to apply a simple methodology may provide with
strong external validity, but it comes at a price. We are not able to work at ﬁrm level, focus
on manufacturing prices and are unable to implement the tools commonly used for evaluation
problems.
There exists some evidence that consolidation through mergers may be the consequence of
excess capacity (Andrade and Staﬀord 2004), which could be associated with a decrease in prices
before mergers. Mergers could then at least partly be a consequence of this price pattern before
the mergers. However, if the decision to merge is likely to be connected with the past evolution
of prices, the exact date of the merger is also likely to be exogenous. It is subject to the existence
of an opportunity for merger or acquisition and to the completion of preliminary steps as regards
the ﬁnancing of the operation, the agreement of both parties, etc. This is particularly the case
for the largest mergers, often subject to in-depth scrutiny by competition authorities (phase II
mergers, see below).
If the bias compared to other sectors did not change in the year after the merger for unob-
servable reasons, the change in trends that occur at the dates of the mergers can be interpreted
as a consequence of the mergers. Causal interpretation of the results would then rely on the
assumption that the bias in sector-speciﬁc inﬂation is constant over the symmetrical two-year
period around a merger. This is the very classical assumption that is common to any diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence method.
Interpreting this change in trend as the consequence of the modiﬁcation of strategic relations
between players would be fallacious if the average evolution of prices before a merger was due to
the imminence of the mergers. This would for instance be the case if, on average, price decreases
before a merger would be due to a price war aimed at lowering the price of the acquisition or to
determine who buys whom. Overall, this strategy would be close to predation. The price of the
target is linked to the beliefs of shareholders on the prospects of the ﬁrm: it would decrease only12
if the price war did shift these beliefs. This strategy would require highly imperfect informational
settings for stock or credit markets. Besides, in order to be proﬁtable for the incumbent, the
losses from the price war would have to be compensated by the lower acquisition price: short
term proﬁt sacriﬁce has to be recouped.
Causal interpretation would not be relevant either if the parties would try to alter the mar-
ket assessment by Competition Authorities through a manipulation of their prices before the
notiﬁcation. Manipulation by the parties is a risk that is taken very seriously by competition
authorities. For this reason, they require high standards of proofs. Our experience of their
practices is that they would be very cautious if they faced a claim by the parties that a decrease
in prices signals that the market has become very competitive. This claim would only be taken
seriously if it were supported by substantiated elements showing, for instance, that the decrease
in price is a consequence of entry or aggressive behavior by third parties.
As far as we know, few theoretical or empirical elements are available to conﬁrm or invalidate
that prices should, or could, generally vary due to the imminence of a merger in a magnitude
liable to invalidate causal interpretations. For this reason, the price patterns we obtain be-
fore mergers are, by themselves, very challenging. However, each time pre-merger prices were
signiﬁcantly increasing or decreasing, one should be cautious as regards causal interpretations.
2 Data
We use sector-speciﬁc production price indices for France for the manufacturing sector, on a
monthly basis from 1989 to 2002. They are provided by the French National Institute for
Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE). The data about mergers is public. It comes from the
Competition Directorate General of the European Commission and from the Directorate General
for Competition, Consumption and Fraud Control of the French Ministry of Economy, Finance
and Industry (DGCCRF).8 Cases reviewed by the European Commission are split between cases
concerning primarily French markets and cases concerning mainly other European markets.
2.1 Mergers
Our list of mergers includes all merger cases controlled by French and European competition
authorities. This dataset includes a code (CPF product classiﬁcation) for the involved sector
and speciﬁes notiﬁcation and decision dates, as well as the type of decision.
8The list of mergers has been kindly provided by DGCCRF.13
From 1986 to 2002, merging companies could notify their project to the DGCCRF, who was
to run a preliminary competitive assessment within ﬁve weeks. After this initial analysis, it
could either clear the merger (phase I) or request an opinion from the Conseil de la Concurrence
for cases that might entail a risk of creation or reinforcement of a dominant position (phase II).
Including the time for the in-depth analysis by the Conseil, the DGCCRF should then reach a
ﬁnal decision endorsed by the Minister in charge of the Economy within four month. This setting
was modiﬁed in May 2002. Notiﬁcation became compulsory above certain turnover thresholds
(mainly 150 million euros aggregated turnover). This modiﬁcation has drastically increased the
number of notiﬁcations at French level.
European merger control was put into place by the European Regulation of the Council no
4064/89 of December 21 1989, which entered into force in 1990. All mergers with community
dimension, for which several European countries were involved, and above certain turnover
thresholds have to be notiﬁed to the European Commission. Within one month, the European
Commission has to run an initial assessment (phase I). If no competitive concern emerge from
this analysis, the merger is to be cleared. If not, an extra three-month period is added for
in-depth analysis (phase II). The regime for European merger control changed in 2003, with the
application of a new framework (Regulation 1/2003).
As we want to ensure some homogeneity in the control regime, we analyze mergers over the
1990-2001 period.9 Even though merger notiﬁcation was not compulsory over the period under
study, we believe that most important French mergers have been under scrutiny by competition
authorities and are therefore present in our analysis.
It is important to stress that several types of mergers are present in the dataset. First,
all mergers reviewed by French competition authorities correspond to mergers involving ﬁrms
active on French markets. On the contrary, mergers reviewed by the European Commission all
aﬀect the Common Market, but, in practice, one or few markets in a few countries are generally
primarily aﬀected. Among all mergers controlled by the Commission, using several proxies10,
it is possible to determine which ones primarily aﬀected the French market, and which ones
only aﬀected it indirectly. We consider as a whole all mergers a priori primarily aﬀected French
markets, irrespective of the authority who actually took the decision. Conversely, cases that
9As we are interested in prices one year before and after those mergers, the corresponding time span for prices
is 1989-2002.
10First, for some mergers, the nationality of the target ﬁrm is present in the DOME merger database. When this
information is not available, we use the language of the decision, considering that when the decision was written
exclusively in French, it was likely to concern the French market. The classiﬁcation is however not perfect, since
it could indeed primarily concern Belgium or Swiss markets, or cases where the acquiring ﬁrm is French, but the
target is foreign. Then we supplemented the few cases written in several languages on a case by case basis.14
primarily aﬀected a non-French market in the European Community are also considered as a
whole.
Secondly, some mergers are cleared after the initial analysis, while others are subject to an
in-depth analysis. In our analysis, we separate the ﬁrst ones, namely phase I mergers, and
the second ones, namely phase II mergers. Mergers that appear prima facie as the most anti-
competitive ones are expected to lead to phase II analysis. However, they also have been
more severely scrutinized and the clearance was generally subject to commitments, such as
divestitures. Therefore, their competitive impact is not clear.
Merger control has an obvious deterrent eﬀect: mergers between two global leaders are gen-
erally not even considered by the ﬁrms. It also acts as a ﬁlter. Some mergers go under scrutiny,
and might be amended through remedies or even prohibited. In theory, it should therefore be
impossible to observe anti-competitive mergers. Nonetheless, it is possible that merger control is
not fully eﬀective, and one should still expect to see some inﬂuence of mergers. Besides, merger
control objectives are actually diﬀerent from limiting short term market power. For instance,
it takes into account eﬃciency gains in the longer run to authorize otherwise anticompetitive
mergers. Even though the very existence of merger control ought to be kept in mind while
interpreting our results, we should still expect to see some short term impacts of mergers on
prices.
Overall, our dataset lists all mergers examined by the DGCCRF, the Conseil de la Concurrence
and the European Commission between 1990 and 2001. Mergers have been split into four
diﬀerent categories: French merger phase 1, French merger phase 2, non-French merger phase 1
and non-French merger phase 2 (see tab. 1). For each merger, one or several sectors were
aﬀected. Then, counters were created for the number of mergers in a given month of a given
year in each sector. The exact schedule of mergers is shown in appendix (see tab. 12 and 10).
Some sectors are over-represented in our sample, and more mergers occurred in the end of the
period. However, most sectors and most years are represented. Besides, no pattern of seasonality
emerges (see tab.11).15
Table 1 : Number of mergers
Number of mergers
French mergers Non French mergers
Phase I Phase II Phase I Phase II
All sample 166 27 416 35
Balanced sample 111 23 276 25
2.2 Prices
As stated before, we focus on producer prices only. Our dataset about prices comes from the
underlying series of the Production Price Index in France. The data is more extensively pre-
sented in appendix. Our dependent variable is producer price indices at a 4-digit level of the
product classiﬁcation. 4-digit level has been chosen as the relevant trade-oﬀ between precision
and aggregation. On the one hand, if price data is too aggregated, it will be hard to measure any
speciﬁc eﬀect of a merger aﬀecting a small part of the sample. On the other hand, the aﬀected
sector, coming from merger data, is not always precisely identiﬁed. The relevant market con-
sidered by competition authorities is in general much smaller than the product sector identiﬁed
within the classiﬁcation of products: in this respect, the deeper the level of the classiﬁcation
the better. Unfortunately, our experience shows that there may be some errors or mismatches
in the coding made by the competition authorities when they deﬁne the involved sectors. It is
also possible that the competitive impact of a merger extends to adjacent sectors.
Our series of price indices cover the 1989-2002 period. 93 sectors are present at the end of the
period. 63 sectors are covered during the whole period, many sectors being added to the survey
in 1995. The total number of observations used in regression analysis is 9072 for the balanced
sample (11006 for the overall one). Before standardization to zero mean, the average monthly
inﬂation in the overall set is 0.074% per month (0.8% per year), with a montly volatility of
0.65%.11 The residual of the ﬁrst four factors has a slightly smaller standard deviation of 0.60%.
The ﬁgures are very close for the balanced set.
11The variables of interest are multiplied by 100 in order to be interpreted as percentages of variations of prices
(at ﬁrst order, log diﬀerentiate price indices corresponds to the relative variation).16
3 Pattern of price around mergers
We regress the residual of the common factors on merger counters. As stated before, we treat
identically all mergers that received the same treatments by Competition Authorities. We split





k for k=-11 to 12. To understand the inﬂuence of the use of factor
model, we also estimate the simpler setup and will discuss the diﬀerences at the end of this
section.12 The sets of αk are used to build a pattern of prices for each type of mergers (reference
for prices is set to 100 to the date of decision). They also allow to test the signiﬁcance of the




k=1 αk) as well as their diﬀerences.
In the presentation below, we will ﬁrst focus on French mergers and then on the non French.
Several mergers may occur in the same market at diﬀerent dates. The eﬀects of mergers are
assumed to be additive and cumulative. This is the only viable hypothesis in the absence of a
history of mergers in these markets. It is then consistent to consider the number of mergers in
one market, rather than a dummy, in the few cases where several mergers are notiﬁed, in the
same month, in the same market. The coeﬃcients αk correspond to the impact of one merger
on the monthly inﬂation rate. In the case of two mergers taking place in the same month, the
market is assumed to have received the “treatment” twice.
Mergers in our dataset were ﬁrst notiﬁed, then subject to control by competition authorities
(either French or European) and at last authorized13. We assume that the incentives to compete
for the incumbents are likely to change just after the mergers. The exact date of this change in
the incentives to compete is unclear. We expect that it will have occurred once the merger has
been authorized. However, if the ﬁrms and its competitors anticipate that the merger will be
cleared, it might also have changed when the project of merger was made public, namely when
the notiﬁcation was issued.
For most mergers, the authorization is issued within four or ﬁve weeks after notiﬁcation and
both dates are quite close. However, some mergers are subject to in-depth analysis that delays
the ﬁnal decision of about three more months (see Data section). We will estimate one coeﬃcient
for each month before and after the mergers. All our speciﬁcations are quite ﬂexible and the
choice of the time reference is secondary.14. As stated before, there might be some leakage in the
12In line with Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), an alternative speciﬁcation with linear trends by sector
for monthly inﬂation has been explored. This would correspond to an acceleration of prices during the period.
The results were not qualitatively aﬀected.
13As we are interested on the eﬀects of merger on prices, we consider only authorized mergers. Prohibited
mergers, which are extremely rare anyway, are discarded from the analysis.
14It only matters for testing the signiﬁcance of the slopes and when when we pool phase I and phase II mergers.17
incentives to compete before the ﬁnal decision of approval is reached. However, we will set the
date of authorization of the mergers as the date of reference. The patterns of prices we obtain
will conﬁrm the relevance of this intuition, since the change in trends seems quite close to this
date.15
3.1 French mergers
3.1.1 Phase 1 mergers
Figure 1 shows the pattern of price in France after a French phase 1 merger. The pattern is
quite ﬂat, and no clear break in prices emerges. Prices are neither signiﬁcantly increasing after
mergers, nor decreasing before. Overall, there exist no break of prices around phase 1 mergers.
The fact that no impact can be attributed to mergers does not mean that these mergers are not
related to price movements. As we will see latter by comparing the results of our methodology
with the basic setup, when mergers occur, the inﬂation pattern signiﬁcantly diﬀers from the
average monthly inﬂation rates.
Some sectors might be more prone to price increases, even for “small” mergers. Mergers
would then have heterogeneous impacts on prices given the characteristics of the mergers and
of the merging ﬁrms. The fact that no clear pattern emerges may be a consequence of this very
important heterogeneity. To study its sources, we split the sectors into several groups in order
to study the diﬀerential impacts of mergers on these groups.
Given the relatively small size of our sample, it is not possible to discriminate sectors on a large
number of characteristics. However, it is possible to look separately at the impact of mergers
on two subgroups split given one characteristic. We will focus on ﬁve diﬀerent characteristics.16
The ﬁrst one is a concentration ratio computed as Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) at sector
levels. The second one is an indicator of the stability of market shares of ﬁrms (steadiness). It
averages the squares of the variations of markets shares of ﬁrms between two successive years.
A market is more steady if the market shares are very stable. Steadiness is negatively correlated
with concentration: if a market is atomistic, concentration is low and market shares variations
are likely to be small, in absolute term. The third indicator is growth. It is built as the diﬀerence
of the logs of overall turnover. This accounts for short term growth and not during the whole
period. The fourth one is the share of groups (in turnover). The last is the openness of the
15Besides, the results are qualitatively similar with the notiﬁcation date as a reference. It mainly makes a small
diﬀerence for phase II mergers, for which the two dates are quite diﬀerent and the pattern indeed shows a delay
in the increase of prices.
16More extensive information on this diﬀerential analysis is presented in appendix.18
Figure 1 : French phase 1 mergers - residual of the four main factors
French phase I mergers 
















Note: Period: 1990-2001. Number of observations: 9072. Number of sectors: 63. Number of concentra-
tions: 111. Plain line is the estimated pattern using the residual of the four main factors. The dashed lines
delineate the 95% intervals. Prices are ﬁxed to 100 at the date of the decision.
market. It is the share of imports and exports compared to turnover. Practically, we will for
instance estimate in the same equation one set of coeﬃcient for the most concentrated sectors
one year before mergers, and another one for the least concentrated ones.
The results provide interesting insights on the sources of heterogeneity but should be inter-
preted cautiously. First, the results are univariate. For instance, declining industries are likely
to have speciﬁc, unobserved, characteristics. These results are thus solely descriptive. Besides,
all variables are not available for the exactly the same sectors or time periods.17 Balancing
the data for the four treatments would have signiﬁcantly reduced the size of our panel. Thus,
each treatment relies on slightly diﬀerent samples. Stricto sensu, only pairwise comparison, eg.
between most and least open markets, is reliable. At last, splitting the sectors into two groups
signiﬁcantly reduces the number of mergers in each group and hence the precision of the esti-
mations. Table 4 in appendix summarizes the number of cases in each groups and the overall
numbers of observations in each treatment.
17For instance, we do not have market shares for year 1988 and are thus unable to compute our indicator of
steadiness for 1989.19
The results for French phase 1 mergers are presented in appendix. Neither openness, growth
or the share of groups make a diﬀerence. On the contrary, an inﬂationary pattern emerges in
the least concentrated markets and in the more steady. As steadiness and concentration are
negatively correlated, it is hard to separate both results. However, the fact that a break exists
for the least concentrated markets, but not for the most concentrated ones is striking. One
should a priori expect the opposite result. However, concentration is a proxy that is used by
competition authorities. There are more French phase 1 mergers in least concentrated sectors.
The selection of phase 2 mergers by competition authorities is likely to play an important role
in this result.
3.1.2 Phase II mergers
Figure 2 shows the pattern of price in France after a French phase 2 merger. It is a clear pattern,
with no clear relative inﬂation of prices before mergers, and a noticeable one just after. The
change is quite close to date zero, conﬁrming the relevance of the choice of the date of decision
as the reference date. The absence of signiﬁcant price changes before these mergers speaks in
favor of a causal impact. Phase II mergers occur between very signiﬁcant players at national
and even European levels. These ﬁrms often have multiple and multinational activities. Besides,
the number of players being smaller, the matching of two ﬁrms is likely to be the consequence of
many other factors than short term price movements of prices in one French market. Therefore,
the endogeneity of prices for phase 2 mergers is less likely than for phase 1 mergers. Then,
irrespective of the control and of the in-depth inquiry, phase 2 mergers would have short-term
anticompetitive eﬀects, the subsequent additional inﬂation being of 1.5%. Short term impact of
these mergers is unambiguous.
However, our results can hardly be interpreted as a proof of the ineﬃciency of merger control.
We voluntarily focused on short term, in order to capture the pure modiﬁcation of strategic
relations implied by mergers. Both eﬃciencies and commitments will have mid-term eﬀects we
are unable to capture. We are neither able to measure which eﬀect dominate in the long run.
The overall impact of mergers could only be measured then, as well as the direct eﬃciency of
merger control18. However, our results show that, as far as strategic relations are concerned,
the expected eﬀect does exist and is of importance: it is twice the average yearly inﬂation in
our sample.
The impact of these mergers might also be heterogeneous. The choice of competition authori-
18Merger control also have the indirect eﬀect to act as a deterrent for clearly anticompetitive mergers, such as
one between two global leaders.20
Figure 2 : French phase 2 mergers - residual of the four main factors
French phase II mergers 

















Note: Period: 1990-2001. Number of observations: 9072. Number of sectors: 63. Number of concentra-
tions: 23. Plain line is the estimated pattern using the residual of the four main factors. The dashed lines
delineate the 95% intervals. Prices are ﬁxed to 100 at the date of the decision.
ties to enter into phase 2 analysis in itself provides some reduced information on their assessment
of the anticompetitive potentials of mergers. As previously, we pursue a diﬀerential analysis.
Given the small number of cases, some results are hardly interpretable (especially for growth).
The results of this analysis for French phase 2 mergers is presented in appendix. They conﬁrm
that there exist a very large discrepancy in the impact of these a priori most anticompetitve
mergers.
The impact is very important for markets with very stable markets shares (least steady). These
markets are prima facie the least contestable ones. Intuitively, mergers should, on average, be
more anticompetitive in these markets. This is conﬁrmed by the regression. On the contrary, the
signiﬁcance of results as regards to concentration is weak. It is unclear that concentration plays
a major role. The break is larger and signiﬁcant for the least concentrated markets only. The
pattern is close to this of phase 1 mergers, in the least concentrated markets also, with prices
weakly decreasing before and increasing after. However, the pattern after mergers is signiﬁcant
only for the most concentrated markets. The selection operated by competition authorities or
the self-selection by merging ﬁrms are also likely to play a role. Very large mergers in highly21
concentrated sectors are less likely to be cleared. If they are notiﬁed, they are likely to have
special features.
Besides, the pattern of prices only appears in markets with a high proportion of groups.
Groups are likely to have multiple activities, and then to interact with the same competitors
in diﬀerent markets. This is expected to favor very grim trigger strategies, and thus collusion.
Overall, the eﬀect of mergers should be more important if there is a higher proportion of groups.
The results as regards openness are striking and complement the latter, as groups are more
likely to be active on international markets. Very open markets may indicate that the relevant
market is multinational or continental. There may exist a European wide oligopoly (and concen-
tration in France only is not a relevant proxy). It may also indicate that transportation costs are
low and that foreign ﬁrms are an eﬀective alternative to French ﬁrms. On the contrary, ﬁrms
operating in less open markets would not be threatened by foreign ﬁrms and mergers would
potentially be more anticompetitive. The result rather speak in favor of the ﬁrst interpretation,
at least for phase 2 mergers, as the inﬂationary pattern emerges in the most open markets only.
On the contrary, the pattern in the least open markets indicate a clear increase of prices that
is stopped by the mergers. Self selection is likely to matter for these results. On average, these
mergers are probably triggered by other purposes than evading from competition. Besides, the
diﬀerences in patterns also indicate that the results as regards to the proportion of groups and
openness where not solely driven by the correlation between the two features.
3.2 Non French mergers
3.2.1 Phase I mergers
We then focus on the impact of non French mergers on French prices. Figures 3 shows the pattern
of price in France after a non-French phase 1 merger. From a legal perspective, the fact that
these mergers were controlled by the European institutions indicates that the common market
was judged to be aﬀected. It is thus legitimate to focus also on the impact of these mergers
on French prices, even if French markets were not concerned in the ﬁrst place. Examining
the consequences of foreign mergers in economically connected area had not been done before.
Contrary to the situation for French mergers, prices are clearly increasing before the merger,
and are decreasing after. This pattern of prices is rather striking. As far as we know, it had
never been quoted in the literature and it is a signiﬁcant contribution of this paper. Focarelli
and Panetta (2003) analyzed the impact of “out-of-market mergers”. However, in this paper the
eﬀect of mergers in markets where there existed no overlap emerge after a certain period and is22
convincingly interpreted as eﬃciency related. Here, the eﬀect emerges on short-term and should
be explained otherwise. A merger between two foreign ﬁrms might for instance be threatening
for French ﬁrms if it allows them to eﬃciently enter or compete in France.
Figure 3 : Non French phase 1 mergers - residual of the four main factors
Non French phase I mergers 
















Note: Period: 1990-2001. Number of observations: 9072. Number of sectors: 63. Number of concentra-
tions: 276. Plain line is the estimated pattern using the residual of the four main factors. The dashed lines
delineate the 95% intervals. Prices are ﬁxed to 100 at the date of the decision.
The results of the diﬀerential analysis for non French phase 1 mergers is presented in appendix.
All patterns are qualitatively similar: prices are decreasing before mergers, and decreasing after.
They are all signiﬁcant, probably due to a larger number of cases than for French mergers.
Splitting sectors into two groups mainly makes a diﬀerence for concentration and openness
only. Quite intuitively, the eﬀect on French prices of a merger abroad has a larger impact if
markets are more open. At last, the fact that the break is larger in more concentrated markets
conﬁrms that mergers abroad act as a threat to French ﬁrms.
The comparison of the impact of French and non French phase 1 mergers raises questions as
to their joined external validity. It could be the case that “not too anticompetitive” mergers
do not harm domestic customers and are beneﬁcial to those abroad. Overall welfare impact
of those mergers would then be positive. On the contrary, mergers may not be comparable
for they would not aﬀect markets with identical histories or because they would aﬀect them at23
diﬀerent moments of their histories. A French speciﬁcity could not be excluded a priori either.
This would be the case if foreign mergers that were beneﬁcial to French customers actually took
place in formerly very regulated or foreclosed sectors. The diﬀerential analysis above provide
some interesting insight. However, the answer to this question of the overall impact of mergers in
interconnected areas is essentially left open for further research at this stage. Deeper analysis on
the exact schedule of mergers in France and in Europe and some case studies would provide some
insight on this issue. However, only similar and crossed analysis in other European countries
and in the USA are liable to provide a convincing answer.
3.2.2 Phase II mergers
Figure 4 shows the pattern of prices in France after a non French phase 2 merger. Prices are
in constant progression on the period. Our series are standardized to zero mean on the period.
Thus, this constant progression does not reﬂect a constant progression over the period, but indeed
a progression around the merger. The progression is signiﬁcant before mergers, but not after.
Overall no break of trend around the merger emerges.
Figure 4 : Non French phase 2 mergers - residual of the four main factors
Non French phase II mergers 
















Note: Period: 1990-2001. Number of observations: 9072. Number of sectors: 63. Number of concentra-
tions: 25. Plain line is the estimated pattern using the residual of the four main factors. The dashed lines
delineate the 95% intervals. Prices are ﬁxed to 100 at the date of the decision.24
The results of the diﬀerential analysis are presented in appendix. Results for steadiness are
hardly interpretable as only four European mergers occur in the most steady markets. The
pattern in least concentrated markets is similar to this for French phase 1 mergers. The break
is even more important.
The pattern for declining and most growing industries are opposed. In declining industries,
price increases are clearly stopped by foreign mergers. On the contrary, in the fastest growing
industries, no pattern emerges before mergers, but prices burst just after foreign mergers. If
sectoral growth in France is correlated to growth in other countries, this would indicate that
defensive mergers have very diﬀerent impact than oﬀensive ones. However, these diﬀerences of
patterns do not emerge for French mergers.
As stated before, less open markets are less likely to be European wide. Then, a foreign
merger is more likely to be threatening for French ﬁrms. This is consistent with the decreasing
pattern in least open markets. This decreasing pattern only exists in markets with a larger
proportion of groups. If the previous result is true, this would indicate that groups are more
likely to be threatened than standalone ﬁrms.
3.3 On the impact of the counterfactual
Table 2 summarizes the results of our methodology for the four types of mergers. It also includes
the results with the basic setup, where the inﬂation is compared to the average monthly inﬂation.
This table shows that the use of factor models dramatically corrects the pattern for French phase
1 mergers. No signiﬁcant break in the pattern emerges in our methodology. On the contrary,
comparing with the average monthly inﬂation rates, prices were clearly decreasing before and
are increasing after. The diﬀerence between the two setups is not due to the fact that the set has
to be balanced to estimate the common factors.19 It is unlikely to be due to the set of sectors
we consider, as the results for the other types of mergers are quite close for both setups.
By deﬁnition, non French mergers concern non French ﬁrms, and primarily non French mar-
kets. They should not be triggered speciﬁcally by French prices. Similarly, as argued before,
French phase 2 mergers are unlikely to be mainly triggered by short term price changes in one
particular market. Overall, French phase 1 mergers are thus those for which prices are likely to
be the more connected to merger activity.
There are weak evidences of a negative slope just before mergers in the basic setup. It is in
line with McCabe’s (2002), and there already exists some evidence that consolidation through
19The application of the basic setup to the balanced set provides with very similar results.25
Table 2 : Patterns of prices for phase I and phase II mergers
Basic setup Residual of the 4 main factors
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
French
mergers
Phase I −0.35∗∗ 0.44∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ −0.13 0.21 0.33
(0.16) (0.18) (0.23) (0.18) (0.20) (0.27)
Phase II
0.22 1.25∗∗∗ 1.03∗ 0.08 1.65∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗





0.49∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗ −1.06∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ −0.47∗∗∗ −0.96∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.09) (0.10) (0.16)
Phase II 1.00∗ 0.54 −0.46 0.97∗∗ 0.62 −0.35
(0.49) (0.44) (0.71) (0.44) (0.47) (0.65)
Observations 11006 11006 11006 9072 9072 9072
Note: Robust OLS estimators. In parenthesis: t-stats. 3, 2 and 1 stars respectively mean 99, 95 and 90








k=−11 αk. French mergers phase I: 166 (111 for the balanced set). French
mergers phase II: 27 (23 for the balanced set). Non French mergers phase I: 416 (276 for the balanced set).
Non French mergers phase I: 35 (25 for the balanced set).
mergers may be the consequence of excess capacity (Andrade and Staﬀord 2004), which would
be consistent with a decrease in prices in these sectors. However, this pattern does not emerge if
we account for a richer counterfactual. Then, the pattern before mergers would not be related to
the mergers, but would be captured by the movements of the common factors at this moment.
The use of factor models does make a diﬀerence. These mergers occur in sectors that are
aﬀected by diﬀerent shocks than the average of the sectors but these shocks are shared by other
sectors. They are not consequences of mergers and are on the contrary explained by factors
that also aﬀect other sectors. This pattern in the basic setup is then very challenging in itself.
Understanding more precisely the asymmetric shocks that aﬀect, and possibly trigger, mergers
is out of reach with the kind of data at our disposal but it would be essential in understanding
merger activities.
Conclusion
We ﬁnd strong evidence of very short term eﬀects of mergers on prices. As far as we know, such
results, on such a large number of mergers and sectors are new. The interpretation of these
results may be twofold. The ﬁrst, conservative one, is that price changes before mergers are
driven by the imminence of the mergers. At least one party to the merger would manipulate
its price, for instance either to pay a lower price for an acquisition or to obtain a more lenient
assessment by competition authorities. The second, optimistic, interpretation is that these types
of behaviors are unlikely to be widely spread. The patterns of prices should then be interpreted26
as a causal impact of mergers on strategic relations, and then on prices. As far as we know,
no general existing empirical evidence is liable to allow to convincingly choose between the two
interpretations. Therefore, prices before mergers, and not only after, are a very challenging line
of research. However, for French mergers, no pattern emerge before the mergers if we use the
richer counterfactual provided by factor models. Then, it would support the absence of strong
endogeneity of prices, at least for these mergers.
Longer term eﬀects of mergers include changes in product qualities, economies of scale and
scope and many other sorts of eﬃciencies. These eﬃciencies may be very important. They may
even, in some industries, overturn the eﬀect we focus on (Focarelli and Panetta 2003). However,
our results on French mergers show that strategic relations do matter for prices, whatever
the interpretation one chooses. We also show that, on average, mergers that are notiﬁed to
competition authorities, especially phase II mergers, do decrease the incentive to compete for
domestic ﬁrms. As far as merger control is concerned, case by case analysis is the only reliable
way to proceed. Competition authorities shall be speciﬁc on the theories of harm they use. The
burden to substantiate the analysis is on them. Mergers that do not generate eﬃciencies are
then very unlikely to increase consumer welfare. Competition authorities are then legitimate to
require the proof of substantial eﬃciency gains, with a high standard of proof, in order to clear
a merger.
As far as we know, our results on non French mergers are also new, as well as the diﬀeren-
tial analysis we pursue. Their robustness is to be conﬁrmed by further research on diﬀerent
countries, and on diﬀerent data. At this stage, they mainly conﬁrm the large heterogeneity of
the impact of mergers on prices. However, they draw an interesting picture. First, mergers in
an interconnected economic area have some indirect impact in domestic markets. This impact
might be positive for ﬁnal customers. Overall, this seems to be the case for prima facie not too
anticompetitive mergers. Would the joined external validity of results for domestic and foreign
mergers be veriﬁed, which is, at this stage, an open question, the overall welfare eﬀect of these
mergers would then be an interesting issue, to be addressed in further research. On the contrary,
these mergers may also have eﬀects similar to those of domestic mergers, for instance if they
reinforced an oligopoly in a relevant market that was larger than France.
At last, the methodology used in this paper is new. It provides with a way to build a relevant
counterfactual in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence framework, when the usual tools from the evaluation
literature are not available. The fundamental assumption is that market prices are aﬀected
by common factors that are orthogonal to mergers. These common shocks are identiﬁed using
the panel structure of the data. This paper shows that the use of this counterfactual makes
a diﬀerence. This is particularly true for French phase 1 mergers, which are exactly those for27
which French prices and mergers are the more likely to be connected. These results are very
promising for the methodology developed in this paper.28
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A Common Factor Analysis
Several tests have been proposed in the literature, either through the use of information crite-
ria (Bai and Ng 2002) or formally based on the eigenvalues of the reduced correlation matrix
(Onatski 2007). The scree plot and the formal computation of the curvature of the plot, which
is underlying Onatski’s (2007) test show that there exist breaks after the second, fourth and
seventh eigenvalues. The second and third breaks might be mainly due to the fact that the ﬁfth
and sixth (respectively the eight and the ninth) are almost equal.20 It cannot be excluded that
four or seven factors would be necessary, even though the statistics of the corresponding test
are generally smaller than the percentiles of the test statistics in Onatski (2007). The ﬁrst two
factors account for 31% of the overall variance, the ﬁrst four for 44% and the ﬁrst seven for 59%.
Stock and Watson (2006), Favero, Marcellino, and Neglia (2005) and Breitung and Eickmeier
(2005) quote that in comparable studies, the common component generally account for 40% or
50% or the overall variance. The variance explained by at least the ﬁrst four factors is then in
line with the literature.
Figure 5
Common Factor Analysis: 











20This would indicate that Onatski’s (2007) test might not be quite robust and that a smoothed version could
be more workable.33
Table 3 : Eigenvalues of the reduced correlation matrix
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Eigenvalue (γi) 6.60 5.15 2.88 2.38 2.00 1.93 1.73 1.45 1.41 1.33 1.20 1.10
Cumulated Variance 0.17 0.31 0.38 0.44 0.49 0.55 0.59 0.63 0.66 0.70 0.73 0.76
Application of Onatski’s (2007) Test
γi − γi+1 1.45 2.27 0.50 0.38 0.07 0.20 0.28 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.11 -
γi−γi+1
γi+1−γi+2 0.64 4.59 1.29 5.73 0.34 0.70 7.65 0.47 0.60 1.20 - -
B Diﬀerentiated impacts of mergers
Table 4 : Diﬀerential impact: number of mergers
French mergers Non French mergers Number of
observations Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 1 Phase 2
Least Concentrated 88 13 201 10
8124 Most Concentrated 74 14 210 22
Most steady 76 10 174 4
7416
Least steady 82 17 235 28
Least growing 65 9 189 18 7368
Most growing 93 18 219 14
Highest proportion of groups 96 12 245 18
8124 Lowest proportion of groups 66 15 166 14
Least open 79 11 182 13
7296
Most open 76 15 215 1934
Table 5 : Diﬀerential impact: French phase 1 mergers
Least concentrated markets Most concentrated markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
-0.43 0.57* 1.00** -0.06 -0.10 -0.04
(0.30) (0.32) (0.44) (0.24) (0.26) (0.35)
Most steady markets Least steady markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
-0.14 0.66** 0.80* -0.32 -0.35 -0.03
(0.27) (0.33) (0.42) (0.26) (0.26) (0.38)
Least growing markets Most growing markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
-0.35 0.13 0.47 -0.23 0.21 0.44
(0.29) (0.32) (0.43) (0.25) (0.24) (0.34)
Lowest proportion of groups Highest proportion of groups
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
-0.10 0.25 0.35 -0.37 0.06 0.43
(0.24) (0.29) (0.39) (0.28) (0.27) (0.40)
Least open markets Most open markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
-0.20 0.23 0.43 -0.22 0.01 0.23
(0.25) (0.30) (0.37) (0.29) (0.29) (0.44)
Note: Robust OLS estimators. In parenthesis: t-stats. 3, 2 and 1 stars respectively
mean 99, 95 and 90 percent signiﬁcance for a bilateral test. Before, After and Diﬀer-









Table 6 : Diﬀerential impact: French phase 2 mergers
Least concentrated markets Most concentrated markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
-0.75 0.97 1.71** 0.91 2.07*** 1.16
(0.60) (0.52) (0.76) (0.88) (0.81) (1.19)
Most steady markets Least steady markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
0.44 0.40 -0.05 -0.07 2.41*** 2.48**
(0.60) (0.59) (0.81) (0.84) (0.80) (1.15)
Least growing markets Most growing markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
-0.63 0.75 1.38 1.16* 1.79*** 0.63
(0.83) (0.82) (1.17) (0.69) (0.63) (0.94)
Lowest proportion of groups Highest proportion of groups
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
1.12 1.57* 0.46 -0.25 1.55*** 1.80**
(0.94) (0.89) (1.32) (0.58) (0.48) (0.73)
Least open markets Most open markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
1.34** -0.22 -1.56** -0.40 1.77** 2.16**
(0.56) (0.60) (0.79) (0.75) (0.69) (1.03)
Note: Robust OLS estimators. In parenthesis: t-stats. 3, 2 and 1 stars respectively
mean 99, 95 and 90 percent signiﬁcance for a bilateral test. Before, After and Diﬀer-









Table 7 : Diﬀerential impact: non French phase 1 mergers
Least concentrated markets Most concentrated markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
0.33** -0.23 -0.56*** 0.49*** -0.64*** -1.13***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.22) (0.11) (0.12) (0.19)
Most steady markets Least steady markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
0.47*** -0.70*** -1.17*** 0.38*** -0.46*** -0.84***
(0.15) (0.20) (0.26) (0.11) (0.11) (0.18)
Least growing markets Most growing markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
0.40*** -0.33** -0.73*** 0.41*** -0.70*** -1.11***
(0.14) (0.15) (0.22) (0.12) (0.12) (0.20)
Lowest proportion of groups Highest proportion of groups
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
0.53*** -0.43*** -0.96*** 0.32*** -0.64*** -0.97***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.22) (0.12) (0.12) (0.20)
Least open markets Most open markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
0.29** -0.30** -0.59*** 0.48*** -0.70*** -1.18***
(0.14) (0.15) (0.22) (0.13) (0.13) (0.22)
Note: Robust OLS estimators. In parenthesis: t-stats. 3, 2 and 1 stars respectively
mean 99, 95 and 90 percent signiﬁcance for a bilateral test. Before, After and Diﬀer-









Table 8 : Diﬀerential impact: non French phase 2 mergers
Least concentrated markets Most concentrated markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
-1.20** 1.02 2.23** 1.79 0.35 -1.44
(0.58) (0.60) (0.83) (0.56) (0.61) (0.84)
Most steady markets Least steady markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
-2.68*** 2.06*** 4.73*** 1.78*** 0.34 -1.43**
(0.68) (0.48) (0.75) (0.49) (0.51) (0.72)
Least growing markets Most growing markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
2.17*** 0.11 -2.06** -1.42** 0.59*** 2.02***
(0.60) (0.70) (0.93) (0.57) (0.46) (0.72)
Lowest proportion of groups Highest proportion of groups
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
-0.21 0.09 0.30 2.66*** 0.74 -1.92*
(0.53) (0.60) (0.81) (0.69) (0.78) (1.04)
Least open markets Most open markets
Before After Diﬀ. Before After Diﬀ.
1.25** -0.76* -2.01*** 0.68 0.89 0.21
(0.54) (0.64) (0.86) (0.58) (0.62) (0.84)
Note: Robust OLS estimators. In parenthesis: t-stats. 3, 2 and 1 stars respectively
mean 99, 95 and 90 percent signiﬁcance for a bilateral test. Before, After and Diﬀer-











Our dataset about prices comes from the underlying series of the Production Price Index in
France. The survey “Observation of Producer Prices and Business-Service prices” (Observa-
tion des Prix de vente de l’industrie et des services aux entreprises, hereafter PVIS) is used to
track the monthly evolution of producer prices for the domestic market. Measurement of price
movement is done at the product level for the main ﬁrms in a given sector, corresponding to a
detailed level of the French product classiﬁcation (Classiﬁcation des produits fran¸ cais, hereafter
CPF). CPF is a French extension of the NACE classiﬁcation used at the European level. The
total turnover covered by the sampled ﬁrms accounts for at least 50% of the sector. Through
a visit to the sampled ﬁrms, INSEE ﬁeld-oﬃcers choose the relevant products along with the
value of the corresponding transactions, including invoice, rebates, etc. Products and transac-
tions are selected in order to be representative of price movements in the involved sector. Each
month, ﬁrms provide prices paid for the chosen transactions. Products and ﬁrms are selected
for a ﬁve-year time span. Every year, one ﬁfth of the sectors undergo a complete review, which
implies a redeﬁnition of the ﬁrms and the products involved. This methodology is modiﬁed if a
given product is not produced any more, either because it is replaced or because the ﬁrm has
exited the market. In this case, a partial renovation takes place, in order to replace the missing
product by a close substitute if needed. PVIS survey coverage has been extended over the years.
In particular, it incorporates more and more service sectors. As we want to focus on a long time
period, we limit our study to the manufacturing sector.
Products are not described in a standardized way following some classiﬁcation. Thus, we are
not able to use product-level information. Aggregated price indices are computed by INSEE
from those elementary series, weighted by the turnover they represent, at diﬀerent levels of the
classiﬁcation. Each product is associated with the French identifying number of the correspond-
ing ﬁrm (SIREN number). A serious diﬃculty lies in establishing precisely which ﬁrm is involved
in a given merger. Unfortunately, our merger dataset does not allow us to fully identify which
legal entity is precisely involved in a given merger. We cannot match mergers to ﬁrm level price
indices, through the SIREN number. As a consequence, we work at sectoral level instead of ﬁrm
level.
Our series of price indices cover the 1989-2002 period. 93 sectors are present at the end of the
period. 63 sectors are covered during the whole period, many sectors being added to the survey
in 1995. The total number of observations used in regression analysis is 9072 for the balanced39
sample (11006 for the overall one). Before standardization to zero mean, the average monthly
inﬂation in the overall set is 0.074% per month (0.8% per year), with a montly volatility of
0.65%.21 The residual of the ﬁrst four factors has a slightly smaller standard deviation of 0.60%.
The ﬁgures are very close for the balanced set.
C.2 Other Data
We supplement our data with others coming from INSEE. Annual business survey (Enquˆ etes
Annuelles d’Entreprise – EAE) and ﬁscal data (B´ en´ eﬁces R´ eels Normaux – BRN) provide ac-
counting data for ﬁrms. Level of export and import come from custom data. As the information
contained in these dataset is annual, we cannot use them directly as control variables. We rather
use them to segment the dataset in diﬀerent categories.
We are able to compute some characteristics of the sectors such as the growth of turnover,
the number of ﬁrms and, among them, those that belong to groups. Concentration is measured
by the Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index, at the 4-digit level of product classiﬁcation. This index is
used to separate most concentrated markets from least concentrated ones. Contestability of a
market should be linked to a stability of markets shares. We choose a proxy which measures







From custom data, we obtain exports and imports value in each sector. We deﬁne openness of






The statistics about these variables are summarized in Table 9.
21The variables of interest are multiplied by 100 in order to be interpreted as percentages of variations of prices
(at ﬁrst order, log diﬀerentiate price indices corresponds to the relative variation).40
Table 9 : Descriptive statistics
Obs. Mean Med Std. Dev.
Concentration 10672 0.088 0.057 0.095
Steadiness 9962 0.0024 0.0003 0.013
Growth 9914 0.025 0.027 0.17
Share of groups 10672 0.081 0.063 0.077
Openness 9698 4.50 3.88 3.10
Note: Statistics over 1989–2001, except for growth and steadiness (1990-2001)
D Merger cases
Table 10 : Schedule of mergers
French mergers Non French mergers
Overall Phase I Phase II Overall Phase I Phase II
Q1 42 37 5 93 84 9
Q2 52 45 6 91 85 6
Q3 51 41 10 99 92 7
Q4 47 42 5 93 83 10
Number of mergers notiﬁed in each quarter of the 1990-2001 period.
Table 11 : Mergers by sectors
French mergers Non French mergers
Overall Phase I Phase II Overall Phase I Phase II
10 0 0 0 1 0 1
14 5 4 0 4 3 1
15 17 14 3 32 27 5
17 5 5 0 0 0 0
18 0 0 0 1 1 0
19 1 1 0 1 1 0
20 1 1 0 4 4 0
21 10 9 1 21 17 4
22 2 1 1 0 0 0
24 32 31 1 84 74 10
25 13 11 2 16 16 0
26 13 11 2 18 17 1
27 14 11 3 22 18 4
28 10 7 3 19 18 1
29 17 12 5 44 43 1
31 9 8 1 35 32 3
32 9 8 1 12 12 0
33 7 6 1 4 4 0
34 20 20 0 42 42 0
35 3 3 0 11 10 1
36 2 1 1 5 5 0
41 2 1 1 0 0 0
Number of mergers notiﬁed in each sector in the 1990-2001 period.41
Table 12 : Schedule of mergers
French mergers Non French mergers
Overall Phase I Phase II Overall Phase I Phase II
1990q1 2 1 1 0 0 0
1990q2 3 3 0 0 0 0
1990q3 0 0 0 0 0 0
1990q4 0 0 0 3 3 0
1991q1 1 0 1 3 1 2
1991q2 1 1 0 1 1 0
1991q3 1 1 0 1 1 0
1991q4 2 2 0 6 6 0
1992q1 2 2 0 1 1 0
1992q2 2 2 0 4 2 2
1992q3 2 2 0 3 3 0
1992q4 2 2 0 2 1 1
1993q1 2 2 0 3 3 0
1993q2 0 0 0 0 0 0
1993q3 4 1 3 6 5 1
1993q4 2 1 1 4 4 0
1994q1 3 3 0 4 2 2
1994q2 6 4 2 4 4 0
1994q3 4 4 0 7 7 0
1994q4 0 0 0 5 5 0
1995q1 3 2 1 9 9 0
1995q2 4 3 1 5 4 1
1995q3 3 2 1 3 2 1
1995q4 4 4 0 4 4 0
1996q1 5 4 1 12 10 2
1996q2 6 5 1 10 10 0
1996q3 6 5 1 11 10 1
1996q4 5 4 1 6 4 2
1997q1 8 8 0 10 9 1
1997q2 8 7 1 5 3 2
1997q3 6 5 1 10 7 3
1997q4 5 5 0 9 8 1
1998q1 8 8 0 6 6 0
1998q2 4 4 0 14 13 1
1998q3 8 7 1 12 12 0
1998q4 6 5 1 10 9 1
1999q1 4 4 0 18 18 0
1999q2 9 8 0 18 18 0
1999q3 5 5 0 15 15 0
1999q4 9 8 1 17 14 3
2000q1 2 2 0 15 13 2
2000q2 5 4 1 14 14 0
2000q3 5 4 1 16 16 0
2000q4 7 6 1 12 11 1
2001q1 2 1 1 12 12 0
2001q2 4 4 0 16 16 0
2001q3 7 5 2 15 14 1
2001q4 5 5 0 15 14 1
Number of mergers notiﬁed in each quarter of the 1990-2001 period.G 9001  J. FAYOLLE et M. FLEURBAEY 
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